Cooperation after war by Martin, Eric C. et al.
Cooperation after War: International
Development in Bosnia, 1995 to 1999
Eric C. Martin
Sue R. Faerman
David P. McCaﬀrey
This paper discusses how predispositions, incentives, the number and
heterogeneity of participants, and leadership (Faerman et al. 2001)
jointly influenced the international eﬀort to develop Bosnia and Herze-
govina. International coalitions, task forces, and advisory groups are
increasingly charged with implementing reforms following civil con-
flict. This requires a complex web of interorganizational relationships
among ngos, donors and host nations at both global and ‘ground’ lev-
els. To better understand development assistance, attention must be
paid to the relationships between these varied players. We find that
four factors influenced relationships between policy, donor, and im-
plementing organizations; and those strained relationships, in turn, af-
fected development success. The paper draws on interviews, conducted
in Bosnia, with 43 development professionals, observation of develop-
ment meetings in Tuzla and Sarajevo, and review of related documents
from international development programs.
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Introduction
The development of collective action arguably poses the central orient-
ing question for the social and management sciences (Arrow 1974; Os-
trom 1998). How do individuals and other types of parties engage each
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other, and what factors determine whether conflict, cooperation, or in-
diﬀerence dominate this engagement?
This paper discusses how four factors jointly influenced cooperation
in the international eﬀort to develop Bosnia and Herzegovina (gener-
ally shortened to ‘Bosnia’, or ‘bih’) between 1995 and 1999. These factors
include (1) the initial predisposition of parties to cooperate, or not to
cooperate, early in a process, shaped by personal experiences and insti-
tutions; (2) the issues or incentives involved in a decision; (3) the number
and heterogeneity of the parties involved; and (4) leadership at various
levels (Faerman, McCaﬀrey and Van Slyke 2001; McCaﬀrey, Faerman and
Hart 1995). These four factors prove useful in the analysis below. And the
situation in the Balkans provides a useful context to explore this interor-
ganizational relationship (ior) framework in a very complex setting.
International coalitions increasingly are involved in social, political,
and economic reconstruction and transition following civil conflict.
These eﬀorts require a complex web of interorganizational relationships
among ngos, donors and host nations at both global and ‘ground’ levels.
Eﬀective, cooperative relationships among these many players seem vital
to successful implementation of development projects.
Practitioners interviewed for this research, and other critics of devel-
opment in Bosnia oﬀered many reasons for limited success, despite the
enormous amount of time, eﬀort and money spent. Some argued that
the ethnic divisions predisposed local parties not to cooperate. Others
stressed that the international community did not respect each others’
work. Many questioned the bureaucracy of bilateral organizations, the
unilateral positions of nato, wb and imf, and the legitimacy of ngos as
partners. Others suggested that few stakeholders had the incentive to suc-
ceed. Contractors received their payment often regardless of accomplish-
ing goals. Power brokers in the divided society retained control as long
as the situation remained uncertain. And frankly, given other hotspots in
the world, Bosnia’s top billing as the darling of the development world in
1995 faded dramatically, reducing multilateral and bilateral enthusiasm.
Some believed that too many players with too many diﬀerent perspec-
tives were working toward undefined solutions. Others suggested weak
leadership, from the Oﬃce of the High Representative, to local govern-
mental oﬃcials, to the major international heads of state that failed to
secure Bosnia’s future from the start.
All of these perspectives individually contributed to the Bosnian de-
velopment story. However, in an eﬀort to reframe and better understand
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development assistance, we suggest that these problems might more ap-
propriately be viewed as contextual features of a complex interorganiza-
tional puzzle. These problems did aﬀect development, but more notice-
ably, directly and immediately, they aﬀected the relationships between
organizations trying to implement specific development reforms. This
more subtle theme emerged repeatedly in our interviews.
Development settings require complex arrangements between orga-
nizations. It is helpful, perhaps, to examine development in Bosnia as
a set or system of iors (Martin 2004; Martin and Miller 2003). Doing
so highlights ground-level implementation concerns. It also helps facili-
tate analysis by specifically targeting the ior as the unit of analysis. This
study anchors itself to those iors, so we therefore view many contex-
tual variables more directly as sources of influence or pressure on these
relationships. Doing so requires multiple perspectives. Faerman, McCaf-
frey and Van Slyke’s (2001) four factors emerged from the literatures in
management, economics, political science, sociology and public admin-
istration. While acknowledging the relevance of each, disciplines weigh
the salience of factors diﬀerently. However, generally, a desire to increase
levels of cooperation, and reduce unproductive conflict or harmful indif-
ference, motivates much of this writing. Below we discuss these factors
as they relate to international development. We focus less on determin-
ing which of these factors proved most salient, instead recognizing how
all of these factors combined to provide opportunities and obstacles for
cooperative, coordinated collective action between organizations.
Interorganizational Cooperation in Bosnia
‘Initial dispositions toward cooperation’ refers, for example, to preju-
dices and stereotypes players have against others. Institutionalized prac-
tices, safeguards, norms, and culture favor certain kinds of behaviors.
They can shape individuals’ encounters with each other and can leave
individuals more or less favorably disposed to cooperating on an issue.
But these initial mindsets also can undercut cooperation, as in the case
of ‘traditional enemies.’ Understanding this institutional background is
essential to understanding interorganizational cooperation. Obviously,
development dynamics are fraught with complex predispositions typi-
cally weighing heavily against cooperative activity.
Such initial prejudices might be overcome, however, depending upon
the ‘issues and incentives’ at play. We recall a striking example of this
after an international embargo was placed on Serbian goods. Serbs in
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Bosnia, more favorably disposed to trade with Serbs in Serbia, very
quickly learned to adjust and find markets with Muslims and Croats
in Bosnia instead. Other issues, sometimes as seemingly mundane as
the spelling of city names in documents, were simply too contentious
to find common ground. Development settings necessarily include both
reforms and issues that are highly contentious as well as those that are
much more acceptable to all.
The ‘number and variety’ of players also proves important in this set-
ting, as the Dayton Peace Accords solidified the partition of the country
into two entities to be split among three ethnic groups, divided further
into cantons and municipalities. This made the logistics of cooperation
diﬃcult, regardless of the issues at play, incentives involved, or initial pre-
dispositions to even begin negotiations. Even intense cooperation can
decay when the forces pulling people together-such as the compelling
nature of a common task or a charismatic leader-no longer dominate
the forces that pull them apart, like deep conflicts over values, or con-
flicting personal or group ambitions and concerns. The sheer number
of stakeholders in Bosnia made diﬀerences in issues and incentives and
predispositions, more likely.
We see ‘leadership’ as an ability to make sense of situations and or-
chestrate actions that is required throughout an organization; which ac-
tors play key leadership roles depends on the nature of the tasks involved
(Graham 1996; O’Toole 1995). Leaders can legitimize solutions to prob-
lems; they can facilitate action that otherwise might break down; and
they can ‘nudge’ people to act in ways that favor or inhibit cooperation
(Faerman, McCaﬀrey, and Van Slyke 2001). Leaders help define situa-
tions for individuals often getting people to think about issues and in-
centives, and maybe even initial dispositions, in particular ways (Gray
1989; Weick 1995).
relationships between the factors
Each of these factors is important individually, but how they play out
in particular situations depends on how they interact with each other.
Each factor potentially moderates the eﬀect of the others on cooperation
(Faerman, McCaﬀrey, and Van Slyke 2001). As such, these features of the
Bosnian case serve as important contextual variables to the relationships
among those players involved in Bosnia. For example, institutionalized
patterns likely shape the issues that surface in an area, the types of leaders
that are rewarded, and the groups that become involved in an issue. Or,
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as noted above, the types of issues that surface may lead us to reassess in-
stitutionalized practices, the desirable qualities of leaders, and the groups
that ought to be included in a decision. Perhaps leaders’ strongest source
of influence is in how they might be able to shape followers’ perceptions
of the way things ‘are’ done (institutions), ‘ought’ to be done (issues),
and who ought to be engaged in a decision (groups) (Gray 1989; We-
ick 1995). The number and heterogeneity of groups involved in a de-
cision process influence the range of institutionalized practices and is-
sues brought into play, and the pool of people from which leaders sur-
face. These are only illustrations of interactions among the factors. What
strikes us is the variety of ways in which they can weave together, of-
ten reinforcing the present situation, but also creating the potential for
change, when change in one factor induces changes in the others.
Methods
This paper stems from research conducted in Bosnia in 1999. Forty-three
diﬀerent senior executives, mid- and upper-level managers, staﬀ and
consultants in national, international and multinational organizations
were interviewed. Thirty of these were tape recorded and transcribed;
others were reproduced using detailed notes. Nineteen participants were
us citizens; five from the European Union; eleven from Bosnia; and eight
from other nations.
Initial access and preliminary interviews were obtained through the
help of a key informant at usaid. A conference held in Tuzla entitled,
‘Development of Production in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 21st Cen-
tury’ provided entrée into the community. During this conference, the
first author was invited to attend the Industry Task Force meeting, an of-
ficial coordination meeting of all the major players in private sector de-
velopment, sponsored and led by usaid. Most participants at this meet-
ing were subsequently interviewed, as were additional representatives of
nearly every other member organization involved. Several interorgani-
zational coordination meetings were then observed, as were bi-weekly
macroeconomic and privatization meetings covering topics like Payment
Bureau Reform or Tax Harmonization. Many of the same players tended
to reappear at these various forums, suggesting subjects indeed repre-
sented the core organizations involved in private sector development.
Interviews with more peripheral or niche players also proved rewarding
and balanced the sample.
This paper also relies on documents, reports, flyers and websites, pro-
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duced by the various organizations involved in the eﬀort. We especially
rely on the reports prepared by the International Crisis Group. This or-
ganization has established a reputation within Bosnia for compiling de-
tailed, influential analyses. For example, its April 1999 report on the fail-
ure of plans to encourage private investment in Bosnia became an unoﬃ-
cial focus of the conference at Tuzla, mentioned above, and an important
piece of work known to nearly everyone we interviewed.
Findings
Our findings reveal how relationships between development organiza-
tions in Bosnia were shaped by the four factors. We focus below on ele-
ments of the case that we believe fundamentally shaped outcomes.
initial predispositions to cooperate
Reliable procedures are the distinctive advantage of bureaucratic forms
of organization (Gerth and Mills 1958), and are key to successful econo-
mies (North 1990). On the other hand, weak legal structures, group
threats and insecurity, and ongoing hostility reinforce each other, as peo-
ple come to rely on political force and actual or threatened violence. The
development eﬀort in Bosnia and Herzegovina tried to reverse such a
situation. The Dayton Peace Agreement outlined a process to rebuild
the nation’s infrastructure, reduce social tensions and foster economic
growth and transformation; and establish a political and legal order that
recognized ethnic identities, but prevented them from dominating so-
cial, political, and economic life.
All of the major national donors participate in annual meetings of
the Peace Implementation Council (pic). These are ‘scorecard’ meetings
where governments and institutions pledge millions to certain eﬀorts,
define broad task areas, and identify lead parties. Participation at these
meetings is at the ministerial level. Beneath and answerable to the pic
are smaller Steering Committees. These committees target broad areas
of activity and establish reasonable ‘benchmarks’ given the funds and di-
rection expected from the pic. At this level, cooperation seemed overt,
eﬀective and tangible, but implementing those policy directives seemed
more diﬃcult.
Informal, ground-level meetings were, according to one respondent,
‘just something that kind of started. Initially, these task forces just tried
to keep track of who was doing what; and now it has gone very much
beyond that to, ok, what needs to be done, who’s going to take care of it,
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what kinds of policies need to be respected in proceeding with this oper-
ation . . . its not just a show and tell.’ Another oﬃcial described them as
‘meetings with diﬀerent parties that are active in this reform process . . .
to discuss relevant issues; . . . where are we, what are the next steps to
take, how are we going to get there?’
Many respondents described these ongoing conversations as, ‘A mat-
ter of doing good work, you want to do good work so you need to know
what else is going on out there; also, a lot of these people you know, or
if you don’t know you might have heard of, and if you don’t know at all
you want to get to know – you learn from other people – it’s just pro-
fessional to explore what programs . . . are in your area.’ Social networks
are important in this ‘industry’; ‘There is a small arena of people who do
this. A lot of the aid people I worked with in southern Africa somehow
appeared here in the Balkans, you know people’s credibility, professional
conduct, skill levels . . . and then at the appropriate time it is referenced.’
The ohr represents the organizational embodiment of the peace ac-
cords. The ohr formally has the authority to remove national and lo-
cal oﬃcials, and has other strong powers to direct implementation of
the Dayton Peace Agreement; in eﬀect, it presently is the highest legal
authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet, this formidable international
presence has had a diﬃcult time coping with the ethnic tension that con-
tinues to dominate Bosnia; the forces that produced the war have consis-
tently undermined the eﬀort to rebuild the country after it. The idea was
that this tension could be reduced through the establishment of reliable
institutions, economic growth, and security for the diﬀerent groups; the
Oﬃce of the High Representative would have the power to force changes
when necessary. However, a report by the International Crisis Group in
November 1999 (1999c, 42) observed that,
The ohr has – at least on paper – ‘final authority’ to inter-
pret and implement the dpa [Dayton Peace Agreement]. In
some regards the ohr constitutes the highest legal authority
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, higher even than the Annex 4 con-
stitution. Nonetheless, the ohr’s authority does not translate
into actual power. Lacking an enforcement mechanism, such
as a loyal constabulary, the ohr is forced to rely on the good-
will and full co-operation of the parties to implement its de-
cisions, as well as to implement dpa. Often, the High Repre-
sentative is reluctant to remove obstructionist oﬃcials, fearing
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that the ohr’s lack of power will become apparent when those
oﬃcials remain in oﬃce. The result is an implementing body
that lacks the ability to implement.
These types of tensions intrude on routine activities in development.
One individual noted that ‘In this whole area it’s also about the past . . . As
long as they continue to argue about who was actually the bravest at the
Kosovo battle and who killed my grandfather or your grandfather we are
going nowhere.’ Another pointed out, ‘For example last week we had a
stupid decision at the Council of Ministers. They were fighting . . . nearly
two years about a border crossing agreement between Croatia and bih,
they all agree on the border crossing, they all agree on everything except
for the names of the towns in the written document.’ A third added, ‘If
the Serbs say something then obviously the Croats and the Muslims say
something exactly opposite.’
The various tensions and contextual concerns mentioned above se-
emed to create initial predispositions against cooperative activity. While
certainly not, in and of themselves, insurmountable, coupled with the
other concerns below, they made cooperative, coordinated action, or at
least a cooperative culture of change and progress, diﬃcult.
issues and incentives
It is easier to address some issues rather than others; thus, we expect
development eﬀorts to succeed in some areas and flounder in others. As
noted above, perhaps the major contribution of the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment was that it stopped the overt warfare. One individual commented
that ‘I value the [dpa] because it stopped the killing and I think every-
one would agree that stopping the killing was paramount.’ Furthermore,
some development tasks are easier and more visible than other tasks.
Activities like building bridges and roads, while diﬃcult in this environ-
ment, were more tangible, more easily quantified and more visible to all
constituents than the development of civil society, for example. Said a
local Bosnian, ‘people see the results, they build some bridge and you see
that and can use it.’
The legal, political, and economic institutions in Bosnia, however, im-
proved minimally at first, given the time, eﬀort and resources devoted to
them. Control of appeals processes, judicial decisions, business licensing,
electoral administration, and other key activities were core political tools
in the tensions among the three ethnic groups. Thus, leaders of local po-
litical factions valued highly their control over these institutions, and the
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institutions did not remotely approximate the idea of bureaucratic eq-
uity and eﬃciency described by Weber (Gerth and Mills 1958). Studies
by the International Crisis Group documented how there had been no
substantial improvements since the Dayton Peace Agreements in the ju-
dicial system (1999b), the system of public administration (1999d), and
in the development of functioning economic institutions (1999a). For ex-
ample, with respect to external investment, the Group noted that, from
1997 to early 1999, private sector investment in bih totaled approximately
usd 160 million, a figure equal to 4.7% of total donor aid. Of this, 80%
came from foreign investors, though many of these were in fact Bosnians
using oﬀ-shore companies and funds. It characterized total private sector
investment in bih as being ‘so low as to be insignificant’; interviews with
Bosnian and foreign businessmen indicated a widespread reluctance to
invest in bih. Donor aid accounted for up to 30% of gdp, and, with-
out it, economic growth likely would be negative (International Crisis
Group 1999a; 1999c). Theoretically, the ohr had the authority to direct
changes in institutions, but it clearly did not have the political and tech-
nical strength to eﬀect or enforce such changes with broad societal sup-
port (International Crisis Group 1999c; 51).
Lacking an enforcement mechanism, the ohr is forced to beg,
plead, negotiate endlessly, and occasionally ‘bribe’ local oﬃ-
cials with the promise of donor funds . . . Local Bosnian politi-
cians will typically co-operate only when it is in the direct in-
terest of their political party. These politicians typically require
the international community to undertake expensive and oc-
casionally unwarranted projects, prior to complying with dpa.
Unfortunately, after receiving international community aid,
Bosnian politicians often refuse to comply with dpa or struc-
tural reform eﬀorts. This is especially true of Croats, Serbs and
to a lesser extent, the Bosniaks.
number and variety of players
Tensions among national groups in Bosnia certainly hindered develop-
ment. However, we are not only concerned with the number and variety
of ethnic groups within Bosnia. There were hundreds of institutions in-
volved in reforms, each with a wide variety of perspectives on problems
and solutions, often, not surprisingly, at odds with others’.
Much of the criticism of the ohr involved weakness in enforcement.
Groups did not make concessions partly (though certainly not entirely)
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because they did not believe that other parties could be forced to make
concessions. Thus, the most prominent proposals for addressing the
problems in Bosnia involved either abandoning the project, or inter-
vening with a force and police powers suﬃciently strong to enforce the
Dayton Agreement (International Crisis Group 1999c; Daalder and Fro-
man 1999). The idea was that this would give reform elements within
the country enough confidence, and political leverage-backed by exter-
nal powers-to try to eﬀect change, which would set in motion the slow
process of building economic and political institutions within Bosnia,
and developing internal administrative capabilities. The criticisms of the
proposals were that they would be politically unacceptable externally-
because they might constitute an ‘open-ended’ commitment; and, in-
ternally, they raised the image of ‘external occupation’ of the country in
such a way as to antagonize nationalistic sentiments.
Finally, we cannot fail to recognize the sheer volume of players in this
environment. In addition to the three ethnic divisions, reforms in Bosnia
were implemented (or not) through the massive public sector, with na-
tional, entity, canton and municipal levels, dozens of multilateral and
bilateral programs, and by 1999, over 500 ngos. The number and variety
of players operating in this small nation was enormous, each with their
own funding streams, political persuasions, constituents, opinions about
the causes and suggested solutions.
leadership
Successful projects in challenging environments require a large number
of professionals with high levels of technical and/or managerial skills
(Van de Ven, Polley, Garud, and Venkataraman 1999). ‘It is much more
hands on than a lot of other places, because there is a political dimension
to everything here, and while the contractor can go out and implement
a complex technical program, he’ll inevitably get caught up in the back
and forth between counterparts who aren’t of the same ethnic group or
areas that are in competition with each other or bureaucrats who don’t
like each other.’ A number of factors work heavily against developing ef-
fective leadership in such a setting.
First, global and domestic politics tightly constrained major decisions
on site. We already discussed the challenges of dealing politically with the
three factions, each of which refuses to make concessions partly because
it worries about the others refusing to do so, or making concessions and
then reneging on them. One way to address this collective action problem
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is to have a central authority that, after consultation and careful thought,
can direct and enforce decisions. Clashing parties may be willing to com-
promise if they believe that settlements can in fact be enforced-that co-
operation will not lead to a ‘sucker’s payoﬀ ’ (Axelrod 1984). In fact, the
ohr was expected to play this role, but (icg 1999c, 51–2):
Lacking an enforcement mechanism, the agency responsible
for implementing the civilian aspects of dpa – the Oﬃce of the
High Representative – began life permanently handicapped.
The ohr, along with the un, osce, and the donors have
been forced to rely largely on the good will of Bosnia’s ruling
ethnically-based political parties to voluntarily comply with
dpa, the same parties who agreed to dpa in the first place . . .
[A]nxious to achieve anything that could be categorised as
progress, oﬃcials in many organisations often follow the path
of least resistance. Rather than enforce dpa, they reinterpret it
to fit the political distortions that they lack the political will to
change, particularly the refusal of local oﬃcials to co-operate
with dpa implementation.
Second, there was a vicious circle aﬀecting recruitment and retention
of skilled people at all levels (Huddleston 1999). Bosnia was a diﬃcult
place to work, leading to high turnover; high turnover means that the
system did not retain a suﬃciently large core of people with the com-
mitment and talents to work eﬀectively there; and this in turn prevented
substantial improvements in the situation, and created diﬃculty for lead-
ers to emerge. This surfaced repeatedly in the interviews.
You can’t consistently keep the chain of communication open
with all the turnover; it takes people too long to learn their job
and what they’re doing, and then to do it and retrain the next
guy, there’s so many people to learn all the places and what
they’re supposed to do for you it’s just crazy.
That’s a problem. They come for half a year, it is diﬃcult. It is
not a team for a long time. They just come together for a short
time and try to work together. It’s a diﬃcult circumstance.
It is very diﬃcult to create organizational entities [with] a
strong team and corporate spirit, and also a unified system of
testing individual performance [and] accountability.
That was the main problem, that people would only stay for
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4 or 6 months and then the memory was lost, and we had to
start again from the beginning,
Third, there was a vicious circle impeding development of managerial
skills within Bosnia. That is, foreign donors generally did not trust in-
dividuals in Bosnian institutions with major projects; host country na-
tional skills therefore were not developed internally, leading to further
mistrust – and again, undermining any potential benefits from strong
leadership.
The international community tends to not put money through
them because when they did put money through, things went
wrong, and so it’s a vicious circle. They are not empowered so
people don’t use them, and people don’t use them because they
continue to show themselves incompetent.
There is no state authority, so there is no big advantage to have
relations with state institutions here. Because of that, the devel-
opment institutions are quite powerful, and they bring money
or expertise and there is, I think, quite an imbalance between
the money and expertise from outside experts and from state
institutions and this discourages cooperation between institu-
tions.
We’ve just created this net, and unless we encourage the lo-
cals to get over the victim mentality to wean oﬀ this extensive
donor support, which is creating a very skewed local economy
with all the money we’ve put in here . . . [and] until we force
them to compromise and find joint solutions on their own, we
are doomed to continue to be the babysitters for Bosnia.
As such, we view these three factors as important variables in reducing
the eﬀectiveness of leadership, at all levels, not only leadership in terms
of the overall development initiative, but within each of the agencies de-
signed to implement such tasks.
Discussion
The logic of this and many development programs is that stronger po-
litical and economic institutions induce ‘virtuous circles’ of economic
growth and stability, clearing the path for further reform. Reformers in
Bosnia have made strides towards this eventuality. We employed an in-
terorganizational approach to provide insight into some of the reasons
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why policy objectives did not always translate into eﬀective implementa-
tion success on the ground.
Our unit of analysis, interorganizational relationships, provides a
meso-level perspective often overlooked in development studies, use-
ful not only as yet another source to analyze potential problems, but as a
more easily altered condition than some of the more entrenched social,
political and economic obstacles to change. More eﬀective relationships
between organizations might represent the proverbial low-hanging fruit
in terms of best practices and lessons learned from less successful reform
eﬀorts.
Ethnic conflict clearly undermined development. However, it seems
too simple or convenient to base an analysis of development failures on
this. Agencies involved in post conflict work should be accustomed to
social division. The ethnic conflicts, however, were so pervasive early on
that only an external enforcer with extraordinarily strong powers could
enforce change. Even if this was politically acceptable, it would have run
into a host of problems characterizing central control of national de-
velopment (Scott 1998). Forcing cooperation likely does not work and
thus reaﬃrms the ‘vicious circle’ perspective. This calls into question the
ohr’s role as ‘lead coordinator’.
The economic perspective of ownership also weighs heavily on any
discussion. Which of the many players discussed above truly own de-
velopment reform eﬀorts? Who pays and who benefits from these? In
complex post-war environments, ownership questions seem a secondary
concern, second only to immediate action to secure peace and begin
making critical reforms. Development assistance agencies must recog-
nize the importance of local citizen engagement and the crucial role it
plays in cooperative action, whether locals are directly or indirectly in-
volved. Development organizations, though powerful, clearly are tightly
constrained by contextual diﬃculties experienced by locals. Typically,
development administration studies focus on flows from donor to host.
This paper stressed the equally important flow from host to donor.
Related, development organizations also need to be concerned with
the creation of a moral hazard to action – where the more they do, the
less their local counterparts feel compelled to do. In something akin to
dependency theory, the international organizations, while trying to do
good, undermine local eﬀorts, stifling local ownership of reform respon-
sibility and accountability. As such, in an eﬀort to turn things over to the
locals, in something akin to a turnkey operation, the ic should be pre-
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pared in some cases to try not to push through reforms, as the reform
itself may not be the key outcome. The process, successful or not, might
be the ultimate goal. Implementers, politicians and observers might be
more patient with some reform eﬀorts and more carefully select projects
so critical as to necessitate bypassing local decision makers.
One might take heed of modernization theory’s deterministic pitfalls
in examining this case. Perhaps the lack of local engagement undermin-
ing cooperative activity (and thus reform success) was based, in part,
on the international community’s insistence that reforms take the forms
that they dictated. In the immediate aftermath of the war, it proved diﬃ-
cult for international players to work eﬀectively with local counterparts.
Unlike in Poland, for example, where local control proved paramount,
transition eﬀorts in Bosnia were constrained by the divided local politi-
cal environment. Thus is the paradox of development and international
intervention. Regardless, eﬀorts must be made to pass the torch on to
locals from the very beginning, involving more mentoring at a time of
great stress and urgency – painful perhaps, but possibly time well spent.
The notion of timing proves salient on a variety of fronts. First, devel-
opment is a very long term process. Funding must be available through-
out the life of necessary reforms, and not just early on when the conflict
receives greater attention. Funding should be spread out over time, and
when analyzing successes and failures, this longer time horizon must be
considered. This study period (1995–1999) represented to many profes-
sionals an ‘initial’ phase of activity. Reforms continue to this day, and
minor successes or even seeming failures made during that initial time
period may have set in place the foundation for greater success later in
the process. We caution observers to perhaps expect less from a society
drained, exhausted, and tortured with the memories of an all too re-
cent bloody ethnic conflict. Observer optimism about Poland’s reforms,
for example, may have altered interpretations of other more diﬃcult set-
tings.
Finally, we must respect the constantly changing environment in
Bosnia. International priorities and policies changed over time, as hot-
spots emerged all over the globe. But also Bosnia changed. Regional
realities, elections, major investments, ohr leadership, nato and un in-
volvement, etc. all changed dramatically within the short time period we
discussed above, but also dramatic changes took place in the years since
1999. These changes reverberate through the ‘system’ described above,
for better or worse, and must be considered, coupled with the other
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concerns highlighted above, with any understanding of development
success, or more immediately, interorganizational cooperation.
In conclusion, our work reduces some of the complexities of interna-
tional development eﬀorts into the potentially more manageable anal-
ysis of interorganizational relationships. As such, we found several key
and somewhat obvious issues that moderated or mediated successful re-
form. Certainly, some political, economic and social conditions cannot
be changed by international development assistance. However, a focus on
being more eﬀective and eﬃcient with limited resources by working in a
more cooperative, coordinated manner, seems more than just a passing
desire. For us, it strikes at the heart of any successful development eﬀort.
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